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The International Criminal Court and its Relationship to Non-States Parties 
 
Robert Cryer
‡ 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In some ways, the level of ratification of the Rome Statute is a triumph. In spite of 
pessimistic predictions about the likelihood of the Rome Statute entering into force 
quickly (or at all)1 it took the (in international law terms) breakneck period of five years 
to achieve the necessary sixty ratifications to create the ICC. By way of contrast, this is 
roughly half the time it took for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
to come into force.  At the time of writing there are 122 States parties to the Rome 
Statute, representing almost two thirds of the States in the world (although, in a more 
cosmopolitan sense, somewhat less than half of humanity). Hence, a significant number 
of States (including three of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, 
Russia, and the United States)) are non-parties to the Statute, and therefore do not have 
any direct duties towards it. This is not to say that there can be no effect on third Party 
states, as Danilenko put it 
 
The pacta tartiis principle does not mean that treaties may not have certain indirect 
effects on non-States Parties. Practice suggests that multilateral treaty 
arrangements often create legal and political realities that could in one way or 
another affect political and legal interests of third States and impose certain 
constraints on the behaviour of non-parties. This constraints may not result not 
from imposition of legal obligations on Third States, but from the fact that a 
large portion of the international community adopts, in conformity with 
international law, a decision to deal with contemporary problems of community 
concern by creating appropriate institutions and procedures.
2
 
 
However, the Rome Statute cannot operated to impose legal obligations on States. 
Whether it is liked or not, third states, absent Security Council action, have no 
obligations toward the Court. Furthermore,  the facts of the continued ambivalence of 
some States towards to the Court, and the fact that the ICC has to operate in an 
international environment that is not entirely conducive to its actions,
3
 cannot be ignored 
by the Court in its operational phase. This is most notable in the case of co-operation. It 
may not seem to be the most exciting aspect of the Court’s practice, and it has to a 
considerable extent been passed-over in the commentary on the Court. However, it is 
key to the success of the Court that it obtain co-operation. Without it cases cannot be 
effectively progressed, either by the prosecution or defence.   
 
That said, unfortunately to some extent, against the background of a weak enforcement 
regime for States parties (as the current difficulties the ICC is having with respect to 
                                                 
‡ Birmingham Law School. This piece in part builds upon themes first discussed in ‘The International 
Criminal Court and Its Relationship to Third States’ in Göran Sluiter and Carsten Stahn (eds.) The Emerging 
Practice of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: Brill, 2008) 115. 
1 On which see William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (3rd ed., 2007) xi. 
2 Gennady Danilenko, “The Statute of the International Criminal Court and Third States” (1999-2000) 21 
Michigan Journal of International Law 445, 448. 
3 For a short discussion see Olympia Bekou and Robert Cryer, “The International Criminal Court and 
Universal Jurisdiction: A Close Encounter?” (2007) 56 ICLQ 49, 54-5. 
Kenya shows) co-operation is all too negotiable with even States parties, with non-State 
parties there is (outside of specific decisions of the Security Council on point) no 
obligation whatsoever to comply with orders of the ICC, hence any co-operation is a 
matter of pure goodwill. That goodwill has to be, one way or the other, earned by the 
ICC, and like all forms of diplomacy, involves compromise. As such the ICC, especially, 
albeit not solely, exists at the diplomatic level as well as the purely legal one.  
 
It is impossible it is impossible to see the Court in acontextually. It is fundamentally 
important to draw a distinction between two aspects of the Court and its work. This is 
the distinction between what might be described as the “juridical” and the “diplomatic” 
roles that the Court has. On one hand, the Court is a judicial body, and it is beyond 
doubt that the decisions it makes must, as a criminal court, be based on the law. That is 
not a negotiable issue.  
 
But within decisions there are degrees. Whilst they must be based on the law, there is 
also a careful balance to be made between what is necessary for a decision and attempts 
to clarify more general aspects of the law, especially when it is not necessary to do so.   
Against this background, it is key to understanding the Court to remember that the ICC 
is, as well as a judicial body, an international organisation, and one which, if it wants 
anything (including ratifications or accessions) from non-state parties, it has to persuade 
states to give it those things. Therefore, of necessity, it has to have, at some level, 
diplomatic role. It has to convince States to grant it assistance, and there are some people 
who are better at this than others. Nonetheless, of course, a careful balance has to be 
drawn in this circumstance between personnel in the court with experience of such 
affairs, and with the requirements of judicial propriety. There are various different ways 
in which this issue manifests itself. 
 
3.1. Interpreting the Statute 
 
The first of these is the simple fact that, the Court’s early practice is being scrutinised 
closely by non-state parties, some of whom are adopting a “wait-and-see” approach to 
ratification of the Statute, and are therefore looking closely at the early jurisprudence of 
the Court to determine its approach, and fidelity, to the Statute. Others are looking for 
sticks with which to beat the Court, accusing it of judicial activism, or overbroad 
interpretations of the Statute. This is not a new fear, it manifested it in the drafting of the 
Rome Statute,
4
 and the Elements of Crimes.
5
 But it has not gone away, and if the Court 
is to gain the confidence of non-Party states (or, more optimistically, putative parties) 
then it needs to take certain precautions. In other words, the court must be careful in its 
interpretations of the Statute. States are watching closely, and any expansive readings, as 
have been suggested at times, have to be very careful when interpreting the Statute. The 
Court scares third parties, as well as states parties, at its peril. Especially if it needs 
anything from them, be it co-operation or possible ratification.  
 
The balance that has to be drawn here is a careful one, and it would be folly to pretend to 
have precise answers to these very difficult problems, but it is worth bearing in mind  
 
                                                 
4 See, e.g. Robert Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime 
(2005) Chapters 5-6. 
5 See, e.g.. William A, Schabas, “Interpreting the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals” in Lal Chand Vohrah et 
al (eds.), Man’s Inhumanity to Man: Essays in Honour of Antonio Cassese (2003) 847, 887; Jacob Katz Cogan, 
“Competition and Control in International Adjudication” (2008) 48 VJIL 411, 421-2. 
international judges are keenly aware that while their rulings can be sweeping and 
influential, they work in fragile institutions. Judges cannot afford to ignore the larger 
circumstances in which their courts are situated, which subject them to pressures 
from competing loyalties, inadequate funding, public expectations, and the 
currents of politics.
6
 
 
As Terris, Romano and Swigart have said, “International judges…face somewhat 
different problems from their national peers. Unlike national judges, international judges 
do not inherit courts of law; they need to build them. The credibility and legitimacy of 
their courts cannot be relied upon, but must be established.”
7
 
 
This traces the distinction made by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht between courts that have 
mandatory jurisdiction and those that have voluntary jurisdiction.
8
 He, rightly, said that 
the principles of interpretation in the latter instance are necessarily less free than in the 
former. As he said, in the context of the ICJ 
 
If governments are not prepared to entrust with legislative functions bodies 
composed of their authorised representatives, they will not be prepared to allow 
or tolerate the exercise of such activity by a Tribunal enjoined by its Statute to 
apply the existing law…With this is connected a further reason for restraint and 
caution in the international sphere, namely, the fact that of the voluntary nature 
of the jurisdiction of international tribunals. An international court which yields 
conspicuously to the urge to modify the existing law-even if such action can be 
brought within the four corners of a major legal principle-may bring about a 
drastic curtailment of its activity. Governments may refuse to submit disputes to 
it or to renew obligations of compulsory judicial settlement already in existence.
9
 
 
As the above implies, Lauterpacht was particularly of this view when it came to questions 
of jurisdiction.
10
 Still, perhaps here goes a little too far, and indeed, elsewhere in his 
magnum opus on point provides his own counterpoint: 
 
At the same time, the necessity for bold judicial action is particularly great in the 
international sphere, i.e. in a system of law in which legislative opportunities for 
modifying rigid, unjust and obsolete rules are somewhat nominal. The result of 
the clash is not without interest, It shows itself in both the in the tendency to 
caution and the apparent desire to create the appearance of caution.
11
 
 
It is no secret that the ICJ’s jurisprudence, at least since the South West Africa Affair bears 
out the difficult relationship between innovation and keeping the parties convinced of 
                                                 
6
 Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano and Leigh Stewart, The International Judge: An Introduction to the Men and 
Women who Decide the World’s Cases (2008) at xx. 
7 Ibid., 103-4. 
8 Hersch Lauterpact, The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (London: Stevens, 
1958) Chapter 6. Mohammed Bedjaoui, “Expediency in the Decisions of the International Court of Justice, 
(2000) 71 BYBIL1, at 17-8. 
9 Lauterpacht, supra note 34, at 76. 
10 Ibid., 91. 
11 Ibid., 77. 
the sensitivity of the Court.
12
 Indeed, even an ex-President of the ICJ has explained in a 
piece that defends a pragmatic, “expedient” approach to aspects of that Court’s 
jurisdiction,  
 
A decision dictated by expediency is therefore one which, while remaining legal, 
is inspired by feelings of appropriateness, wisdom or prudence. These are 
suggested to the International Court by its desire to promote justice and peace 
between States
13
 
 
This is not to say that the ICC ought to be politicised in its decision-making. Far from it.  
The ICC, in the inspirational terms of David Bederman’s, like all international 
organisations, has a soul,
14
 and it is not the purpose of this chapter to suggest even an 
implicit Faustian bargain. It is a criminal court, and the criminal law aspects of its 
decisions ought to be based solely on legal concerns. Nonetheless, the ICC is, as 
mentioned above, a multifaceted body. There are various stages of its activities, most 
notably jurisdictional (including admissibility) and trial, and it would be naïve to deny that 
for the former (but emphatically not the latter) the ICC ought to have regard to the 
weight the (euphemistic) bridge will bear. To fail to do so will not only scare non-State 
parties, but also cause consternation with states parties, whom, lest it be forgotten, rightly 
or wrongly, control the budget, one of the most effective mechanisms of control that 
exist over the court.
15
 
 
In aspects of the Court work that relate to the institutional aspects of the Court, and with 
respect to these parts of the Court’s work, the fairly open nature of the language of the 
Rome Statute on matters such as complementarity means that there is room for the ICC 
to have regard to the acceptability of its jurisprudence to states.
16
 It is worth noting that 
some early ICC jurisprudence has been criticized on the basis that it is over-adventurous 
with respect to complementarity.
17
 In particular, William Schabas has described the 
approach of the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Lubanga case as 
“impetuous”,
18
 as he argued, and the Chamber accepted, that the Court need not defer to 
the prosecution of Lubanga for crimes against humanity and genocide ongoing in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, as they were prosecuting recruitment of child soldiers.
19
 
As Schabas says:  
 
they took jurisdiction on the basis of an interpretation of the Statute which may 
be more intrusive with respect to the criminal justice of States than was ever 
intended. This could well have an impact on future ratifications of the Rome 
                                                 
12 See Edward McWhinney, The World Court and the Contemporary International Law Making Process (1979) 
Chapter II. For an enlightening view on the drafting of ICJ Judgments see Hugh Thirlway, “The Drafting 
of ICJ Judgments: Some Personal Recollections and Observations” (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 15, 16. 
13 Bedjaoui, supra note 34, at 3-4 
14 David Bederman, “The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at 
Lake Spartel” (1995-1996) 36 VJIL 275.  
15 See Bekou and Cryer, supra note 6, at 58 (fn51). 
16 The ICTY at least arguably done this with respect to the question of issuing subpoenae to State officials, 
see Prosecutor v Blaškić, Decision on the Requires of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of 
Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, IT-94-14/1-AR108, A.Ch., 29 October 1997.  
17 Schabas supra note 3 at 182-4. 
18 Ibid., 183; Matthew Happold (2007) “Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga” (2007) 56 ICLQ 713. 
19 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, ICC-
01-04-01/06, Pre-T.Ch. I, 10 February 2006, paras 37-9. 
Statute. Many States are carefully studying the first cases as the Court, to see 
whether its promise to defer to national prosecutions will be respected.
20
  
 
Furthermore, it must be said, that some of the Court’s decisions are not in-depth, and do 
not deal with all the arguments in great detail.
21
 This is unfortunate, as the ICJ has found, 
it is important to show the “working-out” of the Court, to ensure that States who are 
looking at the jurisprudence of the Court are confident in its reasoning, and that their 
arguments will be taken seriously.
22
  
 
Where matters come to trial, of course, the situation is different. A person is entitled, 
both by general international law,
23
 and, more specifically, the Rome Statute, to be 
afforded a detailed list of fair trial rights, and it would be scarcely reconcilable with such 
rights for the ICC to determine the criminal law aspects of a case with regard to 
extraneous factors such as the extent to which States will accept that jurisprudence. The 
possibility of influence from States on matters relating to trial could only undermine the 
ICC, as some fear (or hope) has been the effect of the early practice of the Court in 
relation to Uganda (although admittedly, in this instance, not relating to ongoing trials),
24
 
and the Barayagwiza affair before the ICTR showed.
25
   
 
 
3.2. Not Just Judges: The Practice of the Prosecutor 
 
Of course, the judges are not the only interpreters of the Statute, the Prosecutor also has 
a role here, and a very important one. This is with respect to whether to initiate an 
investigation when he has either had a matter referred to him by States or the Security 
Council under Article 12, or by virtue of the proprio motu powers provided for in Article 
15 of the Statute.
26
 Indeed, given the political fallout that has accompanied prosecutorial 
choices so far (in particular the criticisms of the Prosecutor for focussing (rightly or 
wrongly) on Africa))27 in terms of the perceived legitimacy of the Court the Prosecutor’s 
role may be considered the most important one. Deciding which situations to investigate 
and which not to, is an exercise in judgment. Hence, in spite of the fact that Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, the first Prosecutor of the ICC repeatedly asserted that he acted solely 
on the Law, and would not take into account political considerations, this was not 
broadly believed. And rightly so, the decision on situation selection is one which cannot 
be taken on solely legal grounds, and the practice of the Prosecutor has been criticised on 
this basis. In an earlier contribution, this author looked into the decision of the 
Prosecutor not to investigate the Iraq situation with this in mind. It is the purpose of 
                                                 
20 Schabas, supra note 3, at 184. 
21 Ibid., 182. 
22 Lauterpacht, supra note 34, Chapter 3. 
23 See generally Stefan Trechsel,. Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2005); Gabrielle McIntyre, Defining 
Human Rights in the Arena of International Humanitarian Law: Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICTY” in Gideon Boas and William A. Schabas (eds.), International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law 
of the ICTY (2005) 193 
24 For a discussion of this practice see Matthew Happold, “The International Criminal Court and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army” (2007) 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law 159. 
25 Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, Decision, ICTR-97-19-AR72, A.Ch. 19 November 1999. Prosecutor v Barayagwiza, 
Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration) ICTR-97-19-AR72, A.Ch. 31 March 2000, 
see William A. Schabas, “Prosecutor v Barayagwiza” (2000) 94 AJIL 563. 
26 See generally section III of this volume. 
27 On which see e.g. Kai Ambos,  ‘?? The African Criminal Court’ in William Shabas et al (eds.), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to International Criminal Law(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013) ?? 
much of this piece to look at some of the more recent aspects of the practice of the 
Court, to reemphasise that the Court, and its constituent organs, have a necessary 
diplomatic side. This involves both Parties to the Rome Statute, and no 
 
 
SC 
 
Sudan 
 
11th report 
 
63. In particular, over the next months, the UNSC can act upon UNSC 1593 and 
Presidential Statement 21 to secure the cooperation for the arrest of Ali Kushayb and 
Ahmad Harun. The Prosecution understands that the Council can accomplish this under 
various mechanisms including the existing UNSCR 1591 regime. UNSCR 1591, para 3(c) 
provides for application of these measures to individuals “who (…) commit violations of 
international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities.” The UNSCR 1591 
regime has already been put into practice through UNSCR 1672, which added four 
names of individuals to be subject to the measures set out in UNSCR 1591, namely 
freezing all funds, other financial assets and economic resources owned or controlled by 
the individuals in question. 
 
64 notes has done it for ICTY 
 
65. The legal framework for cooperation established by the Security Council through 
UNSCR 1593 and Presidential Statement 21 is clear. The failure to arrest Ahmad Harun 
and Ali Kushayb sends a signal that impunity will not only be tolerated, it will be 
encouraged. 
 
66. The means to act are entirely within the UNSC’s remit. The Prosecution would 
however urge the UNSC to focus first on individual measures in relation to Kushayb and 
Harun, in particular the identification and freezing of their assets 
 
Para 94 As it prepares for the anniversary of resolution 1325 and for its special session of 
October 2010, the Council can take important measures, to ensure that Ahmad Harun 
and Ali Kushayb, both charged with crimes of sexual violence as war crimes and crimes  
against humanity, are subject to individual measures that will isolate them, ultimately  
ensure their arrest and surrender, and send the message to the victims in Darfur that the  
UN Security Council is protecting them 
 
12th report 
83. The GoS, as the territorial State, has the primary responsibility and is fully able to  
implement the warrants, with no external interference and consistent with its sovereign  
authority. It has not done so. 
 
13th Report  
The UNSC Presidential statement of 16 June 2008 which “takes note of the efforts made 
by the Prosecutor…to bring to justice the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Darfur and in particular notes the…transmittal by the Registry…of arrest 
warrants..[and] in this respect urges the Government of the Sudan and all other parties to 
the conflict in Darfur to cooperate fully with the Court,” has remained unheeded by the 
Government of the Sudan.  
79. On 12 May 2011, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its “Decision informing the United 
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute 
about Omar Al-Bashir's recent visit to Djibouti.” On 31 May 2011, the President of the 
Assembly of States Parties met the President of the UN Security Council to address this 
issue 
 
15th report 
  
51. The role of the Council in ending impunity and preventing the commission of new 
crimes cannot be overstated. Whenever the Council has expressed itself forcefully, 
cooperation with the ICC has been forthcoming. Whenever the Council, and the 
international community at large, have failed to integrate the peace and justice 
requirements, the Government of the Sudan has rejected cooperation.  
 
57. The GoS has failed in its responsibility to cooperate with the Court and to arrest and 
surrender those individuals sought by the ICC. The obligation to ensure compliance, 
therefore, now falls on the collective community of States. It is for the Security Council 
to consider what measures can be taken to ensure execution of the arrest warrants short 
of military intervention. The Security Council issued Resolution 1593 (2005) under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Until now the execution of the arrest warrants on the 
Sudanese territory was the primary responsibility of the GoS. The Council can assess new 
legal and operational possibilities for enforcing its decisions under Chapter VII in the 
case of the Sudan. The Office is not proposing that UNAMID be authorized to assist in 
the operations aimed at securing arrests. Instead, the Council can in due course evaluate 
other possibilities including asking UN Member States or regional organizations to 
execute arrest operations in furtherance of the arrest warrants issued by the International 
Criminal Court.  
 
17th Report  
 
46 It is a matter of real import that States in both the Security Council and the Assembly 
of States Parties address the issue in a concerted and united fashion. Implementation of 
arrest warrants is vital to the realisation of the goals of the Court and international 
justice. Without arrests, no trials are possible, and the search of victims for justice 
remains unanswered.  
 
 
50 The Office of the Prosecutor calls on the Security Council to ensure Sudan’s 
compliance with UNSCR 1593, and calls on Rome Statute States Parties to do whatever 
they can to promote cooperation and the arrest of individuals wanted by the ICC in the 
Darfur situation. The Office will continue to monitor the Darfur situation.  
 
18th Report 
 
19. On 9 October, the Office notified the Pre-Trial Chamber of the possibility of Mr Al- 
Bashir’s travel to Addis Ababa on 11 October and subsequently to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia on 13 October. The Chamber immediately invited the Federal Republic of 
Ethiopia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to arrest the suspect and surrender him to the 
Court, in the event he enters their territory. In both cases, Mr Al-Bashir completed the 
contemplated travel and the warrants of arrest were not executed. 
 
23. On 13 November, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued two decisions on cooperation: one 
in relation to the Central African Republic and the other relating to the Republic of 
Chad. The Chamber reminded both States of their statutory obligations to execute the 
pending decisions concerning the arrest and surrender of Mr Hussein to the Court and 
requested both States to immediately arrest Mr Hussein and surrender him to the Court 
should he enter their territory 
 
53. The Office takes this opportunity to recall the eight communications from the Court 
informing the Security Council about non-cooperation in the Darfur situation, either by 
the Government of the Sudan or by other States, in relation to the four suspects at large.  
 
54. In particular, the Office recalls the statement of the Chamber in these cases that “the 
ICC has no enforcement mechanism and thus relies on the States' cooperation, without 
which it cannot fulfil its mandate and contribute to ending impunity.” The Council has 
not yet responded to these communications, neither has it taken any action. 
 
55. The Council’s silence and inaction contributes to the Sudan’s continued 
determination to ignore the Council. As the Pre-Trial Chamber has further stated, 
“[w]hen the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers a 
situation to the Court as constituting a threat to international peace and security, it is 
expected that the Council would respond by way of taking such measures which are 
considered appropriate, if there is an apparent failure on the part of the relevant State 
Party to the Statute to cooperate in fulfilling the Court's mandate entrusted to it by the 
Council. Otherwise, if there is no follow up action on the part of the Security Council, 
any referral by the Council to the ICC under Chapter VII would never achieve its 
ultimate goal, namely, to put an end to impunity. Accordingly, any such referral would 
become futile.” 
 
57. The Office calls on the Security Council to ensure the Sudan’s compliance with 
UNSCR 1593, and calls on Rome Statute States Parties to promote cooperation and 
affect the arrest of individuals wanted by the ICC in the Darfur situation. The Office 
further notes that all States are urged by the Security Council to cooperate with the 
Court’s investigations and prosecutions in Darfur. The Office will continue to monitor 
the Darfur situation. 
 
58. Without stronger action by the Security Council and State Parties, the situation in the 
Sudan is unlikely to improve and the alleged perpetrators of serious crimes against the 
civilian population will not be brought to justice 
 
Immunities (2013)  
 
Libya 
 
US 
 
Palestine  
 
Outreach to other States 
 
ICC Responses   
 
 
 
 
The former two sets of powers have caused considerable controversy, in particular with 
respect to self-referrals,
28
 and the Darfur referral.
29
 Most diplomatically difficult, with 
respect to the initial decision to initiate an investigation, however, are those suggestions 
that the Prosecutor use his proprio motu powers, especially in relation to those which urged 
him to look into the situation in Iraq. In his initial response, the Prosecutor the 
Prosecutor took an approach grounded firmly in the Statute, noting that 
 
38 Communications express the view that a crime of aggression took place in the 
context of the war in Iraq. The Court cannot proceed with respect to aggression 
until the crime is defined and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction set 
out. The Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court may 
adopt such a definition to a review conference to be convened in 2009. Thus the 
alleged crime to which these communications refer does not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court.
30
 
 
The emotions of the Prosecutor can only be speculated over, but there language of the 
response gives some reason to believe that there was, indeed, a sigh of relief over this. 
The communications on Iraq, nonetheless kept on coming, necessitating a further 
response, which came in February 2006. It is worth setting out the manner in which he 
responded in detail. The Prosecutor began by emphasising the limited nature of his role: 
 
While sharing regret over the loss of life caused by the war and its aftermath, as 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, I have a very specific role and 
mandate specified in the Statute. …The Rome Statute defines the jurisdiction of 
the Court and a limited set of international crimes…Unlike a national prosecutor, 
who may initiate an investigation on the basis of very limited information, the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court is governed by the relevant 
regime under the Rome Statute. Under this regime, my responsibility is to carry 
out a preliminary phase of gathering and analyzing information, after which I 
may seek to initiate an investigation only if the relevant criteria of the Statute are 
satisfied.
31
 
 
The Prosecutor clearly here is attempting to set out his own understanding of the 
importance of avoiding expansive claims of jurisdiction, thus ensuring that he adopted a 
position that is not overly threatening to states, whilst not appearing insensitive. This 
approach though, also sets up the substantive aspect of the response, which reiterates, 
and expands upon his earlier comments: 
 
The events in question occurred on the territory of Iraq, which is not a State 
party to the Rome Statute and which has not lodged a declaration of acceptance 
                                                 
28 On which see Jann Kleffner’s contribution to this volume. 
29 Robert Cryer, “Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice” (2006) 19 LJIL 195. 
30 ICC Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, “Communications Received by the Prosecutor of the ICC”, 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html, at 2. 
31 Iraq Response, 9 February 2006, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_com.html, at 1.  
under Article 12(3), thereby accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore in 
accordance with Article 12, acts on the territory of a non-State party fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court only when the person accused of the crime s a 
national of a State that has accepted jurisdiction (Article 12(2)(b)). As I noted in 
my first public announcement on communications, we do not have jurisdiction 
with respect to actions of non-State party nationals on the territory of 
Iraq.
32
…Some communications submitted legal arguments that nationals of 
States Parties may have been accessories to crimes committed by nationals of 
non-State parties. The analysis of the Office applied the reasonable basis standard 
for any form of individual criminal responsibility under Article 25.
33
  
 
On this basis, the Prosecutor stated that there was not sufficient evidence that there were 
such instances of complicity. This is interesting, however, given that the ICC proceeded 
to an evidential evaluation. It might be thought that it was odd that the Prosecutor felt it 
necessary to make this further response. The reason seems to be that the Prosecutor was 
responding at least in part to a report submitted by the NGO Peacerights to the Court in 
2004. The report, prepared after an enquiry by eight eminent international lawyers,
34
 
asserted that there was sufficient evidence to establish that in addition to using cluster 
weapons itself, the UK had also allowed UK platforms to be used by US forces to fly 
sorties in which such weapons were used, including in built-up areas.  
 
This was not quite the gravamen of the request to the Prosecutor, however. The report 
sought to use allegations of war crimes committed by the US to issue a collateral attack 
on the lawfulness of the war in Iraq. The report argued that British nationals could be 
held responsible for war crimes said to be committed by US nationals, owing to a joint 
criminal enterprise,
35
 that joint enterprise being the crime of aggression against Iraq.
36
  
By doing so the report argued that the Court would not be acting ultra vires in declaring 
that the war in Iraq was unlawful, as in doing so the court would not be exercising 
jurisdiction over aggression as it was not actually holding any individual liable for the 
crime: 
 
In concluding that aggression had been committed, the ICC would not be 
exercising jurisdiction over aggression, as it would not be attempting to actually 
hold any person accountable for the crime. It would merely be reaching the view 
that the criminal enterprise of waging aggressive war had been committed as a 
preliminary circumstance to the prosecution of criminal acts over which it may 
exercise jurisdiction-namely crimes against humanity and war crimes.
37
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connections to the territory of States Parties, but in light of the applicable law under Article 21, the 
peripheral connections indicated by the available information did not appear to satisfy the requirements for 
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 As the Chair of the Commission said, this interpretation “broke new ground”.
38
 Given 
that it dealt with, in practical terms, with making a declaration of the criminal nature of 
the attack on Iraq against a third State, when the crime is not, as the report itself noted, 
in the jurisdiction of the Court, it might be expected that the Prosecutor would be 
sceptical. He was. The response took what was unquestionably the diplomatically most 
sensible route: 
 
Many of the communications received related to concerns about the legality of 
the armed conflict. While the Rome Statute includes the crime of aggression, it 
indicates that the Court may not exercise jurisdiction with respect to it (Article 
5(2). This arrangement was established because there was strong support for 
including the crime of aggression but a lack of agreement as to its definition or 
the conditions under which the Court could act…In other words, the 
International Criminal Court has a mandate to examine conduct during the conflict, 
but not whether the decision to engage in armed conflict was legal. As the Prosecutor 
of the International Criminal Court, I do not have the mandate to address the 
arguments on the legality of the use of force or the crime of aggression.
39
 
 
Also, whether it might have been at one level satisfying for him to attempt to adopt such 
an innovative approach to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Prosecutor here was clearly 
aware of the risks that accepting the Report’s analysis would have for the relationship of 
the ICC with states. This was with respect not only with states Party to the Statute, (who 
would probably have been unhappy about it) but, more importantly, with non-Parties to 
the Statute, who would be brought within the jurisdiction of the Court for their actions 
outside of the territories of State parties. It would have involved declaring that the 
actions of the US to be aggressive. The response of the US to what it would (not without 
some justification) have considered an exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction are quite 
predictable.  
 
The US would be unlikely to be the only non-state party who would cry foul at such a 
decision, as other States would be concerned that their actions could be “declared” upon 
by the Court by virtue of an allegation that there was a joint criminal enterprise involving 
some actions that could be considered to be aggression, war crimes or crimes against 
humanity. It must be said, the interpretation would certainly not have been in accordance 
with the understanding of the drafters of the provisions of the Rome Statute, and thus 
the Prosecutor’s actions must therefore be seen as legally, as well as diplomatically, 
sound. 
 
There is another side to the Prosecutor, however, when he is dealing with one non-party 
state: Sudan. Sudan is in a special position with respect to the Court owing to the 
Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to the Court in Resolution 1593. This 
in addition to the requirement that Sudan cooperate with the Court does create a sui 
generic position for Sudan, as a non-Party that is nonetheless obliged, by virtue of its 
membership of the UN to cooperate with the Court. Perhaps as a result of this status, 
and the truculent attitude of the Sudanese government towards the court, the Prosecutor 
has made some less than diplomatic comments about Sudan. Hence in 2007, the 
Prosecutor reported to the Security Council that Sudan 
                                                 
38 Bowring, supra , note 59, at 66. 
39 Iraq Response, supra note 56, at 4. 
 
Is not co-operating. The GoS [Government of Sudan] has taken no steps to 
arrest and surrender Ahmad Harun…Ahmad Harun is still allowed to play a role 
in this situation. As Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, he has been put 
in a position to control the livelihood and security of those people he displaced. 
The GoS has maintained him in this position with full knowledge of his past and 
present activities. GoS officials, far from taking steps to stop the crimes, publicly 
deny their assistance. These are clear indication of the support Ahmad Harun is 
receiving. Such active support to a person charged by the Court and to his 
activities warrants further investigations by the Office [of the Prosecutor].
40
 
 
In these circumstances, the Prosecutor has therefore taken a very strong view. That view 
being that not only is the Sudanese government in violation of its obligations towards the 
Security Council, but that the assistance granted to Harun may amount to crimes in the 
Rome Statute. Given that none of the offences against the Court provided for in Article 
70 of the Rome Statute seem to be appropriate, it appears that he means complicity in 
one (or more) of the offences in Article 5. This is a bold (although not unjustified) 
approach, and it seems only explainable on the basis that the Prosecutor does not feel 
inhibited when dealing with a situation referred by the Security Council,
41
 as it is the 
Council who will bear the brunt of any criticism.  
 
4. Judges and Diplomats 
 
The necessity of understanding the context in which the court operates leads on to one 
of the criticisms that has been made of the early practice of the Court, (or to be more 
exact, the State parties’ practice) which has been to elect, amongst the judges those with 
diplomatic experience.
42
 There are those who have been critical of those appointments, 
on the basis that the judges should solely be drawn from the judiciary (or, where the 
critiques come from academics, from the judiciary and the academy). Although it is true 
that there are a number of judges on the Court who have come from backgrounds in 
government service, there are reasons to avoid undue critique of the court, and there are 
at least two reasons why there is more to this than a simple split between “pure” lawyers 
and those “tainted” with government service. 
 
The first of these is that the primary ground upon which a person ought to be judged in 
this are is if they are a good lawyer or not. It would be invidious to discuss those at the 
Court, but two examples from elsewhere will suffice to show that those with 
governmental experience need not be anything other than first-rate. Both Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice and Philip Jessup had careers in government before moving to the bench. 
Whether or not all of their judgments are agreed with, their abilities as judges are beyond 
                                                 
40 Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant 
to UNSCR 1593 (2005) 5 December 2007 paras 3, 6. 
41 Some go as far as to consider the ICC as best viewed as almost being two courts, one when it acts on the 
basis of State referrals or the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers and another when the Security Council has 
referred a matter, George Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, “The ICC: Two Courts in One?” (2005) 4 JICJ 
428. 
42 This is an in issue which is by no means unique to the ICC, see for example Shabtai Rosenne, The Law 
and Practice of the International Court of Justice (4th ed., 2005) at 359.  
debate.
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 Therefore, the fact that there are those with diplomatic experience should not, 
in itself, be a matter of concern. Where there are possible reasons to doubt impartiality, 
Judges are required to recuse themselves from sitting.
44
 International Criminal Courts 
have, in the modern era, taken a sterner view of the grounds that require this than other 
international courts.
45
 
 
There is, of course, the question of whether judges from government service will have 
been socialised into a certain form of thinking about international law, which favours the 
State.
46
 There is the possibility of this, however, there are reasons to believe that this 
need not be overly concerning. First amongst these is that there are sufficient other 
members of the court to balance this interest. As Terris, Romano and Swigart’s explain: 
 
Each person working for an international court carries a sense of how best to 
accomplish the job of justice, a sense created through long experiences in his 
home country surrounded by others with a similar understanding of the world or, 
alternatively, in the expatriate or diplomatic circles in which he grew up or served 
professionally before joining the court. In…judicial institutions…tensions related 
to different worldviews may arise, not only inside the courts themselves, which 
are characterized by alliances and hierarchies like other large institutions, but also 
in relation to the work they perform and the constitutencies they serve. Within 
these tensions, however, there exists an enormous potential for forging new and 
powerful collective approaches to justice that can still honor the multiplicity of 
cultural understandings found both inside the courts and around the world at 
large.
47
 
 
Second, even accepting that such socialisation necessarily affects the approach of lawyers 
at a conscious or other level,
48
 the contrasting argument might be made, that they act as a 
counterbalance to any unreasonably expansionist tendencies on the part of other 
members of the court. This relates to one of the major arguments in favour of having 
some members on the court with diplomatic (legal) experience. Their reading of the 
runes on what will prove beyond the tolerance of states is likely to prove useful for the 
court as a whole. In other words,  
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because international courts tackle very different sets of international and 
Transnational problems in various legal and political context, a bench made of a 
blend of people with different backgrounds is a crucial asset. Indeed, each of the 
three basic pools from which candidates are drawn contributes uniquely to the 
blend. Diplomats can provide an understanding of the larger political framework 
within which the case is embedded, as well as potential ramifications of 
judgments. Academics are able to connect the judgment to the larger 
construction of international law, providing the formal correctness and 
consistency necessary to buttress the legitimacy of the ruling. National judges, 
obviously, how to judge…Each group naturally has weaknesses as well. 
Diplomats tend to be too deferential to governmental and systemic interests and 
often argue for the status quo. Academics are often accused of being incapable of 
participating in a consensus, of being too abstract, and of being “maximalists” 
who are disinclined to make the necessary compromises of judicial work. 
National judges might have too little understanding and appreciation of 
international law and may not be as worldly as those in the other groups.
49
 
 
A careful balance, naturally, has to be struck here, and much must be left to judgement, 
but courts must be careful, whilst respecting the reasonable expectations of states, to 
ensure their institutional integrity, and have to remain independent of states.
50
 Finally, it 
may also be pointed out that socialisation is more than a one-way process, and being in 
the ICC itself is a part of a socialising process that operates on such people.
51
 
 
4.1. Judicial Diplomacy  
 
The next thing on point which needs discussion is that the ICC needs to engage in 
diplomatic work. Hence it is necessary to accept that when the ICC takes time (and 
spends money) on outreach work with States not parties, this is a useful thing. The 
Assembly of States Parties, as was seen at the outset of this chapter, has made clear that 
it views universal ratification as a goal, and this will not happen without outreach work 
with non-parties. Therefore, as the ICC itself has said: 
 
The primary responsibility for promoting ratification of the Rome Statute 
belongs to the States Parties and other supporters of the Court and not to the 
Court itself. Nevertheless, the Court contributes to others’ efforts to achieve 
universality by providing information about its functions and role to interested 
audiences.
52
 
 
Further to this, President Kirsch (an ex-Canadian diplomat) visited Japan a number of 
times to provide information about the Court, which helped contribute to Japan’s 
accession to the Rome Statute, a major boost for the Court. He has also visited, inter alia, 
Turkey, Guatemala, Ukraine and Chile, and received visits from many other 
governmental delegations at the Court, and representatives from Inter-Govenrmental 
organisations such as the Arab League.
53
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There has also been considerable outreach activity in the non-governmental sector, 
particularly in the US, where ICC President Kirsch has undertaken considerable work to 
increase knowledge of, and support of the ICC amongst those outside the government. 
The reason for this, is, in his words,  
 
I have found for a very long time that one of the best ways to ensure that the 
International Criminal Court ...has the support it needs to succeed in its mission 
is through providing accurate and as complete as possible about the Court.
54
 
 
This is important work if a long term view is taken, and it might, admittedly a little 
optimistically, be noted that there has been, quietly, been something of a thaw towards 
the ICC in the Bush administration in the past few years, and both the Republican 
nominee (John McCain) and most of the Democratic candidates have expressed some 
degree of support for the ICC,
55
 a large change from the Bush-Kerry competition of 
2004, in which the ICC was a topic in which the candidates appeared to involve 
themselves in a competition to cast aspersions on the utility and advisability of the Court. 
The thaw that can be seen in US relations towards the court (which includes quietly 
providing some assistance in relation to the Darfur investrigations) seems unlikely to 
have occurred in the absence of some (private) contact.  
 
The difficult question is how these need to be balanced against the judicial work of the 
court. This is again a difficult issue, but we do have some guidance, primarily from the 
code of judicial ethics which the ICC has promulgated. According to the Code, Judges 
are not to engage in any activities that are “likely to interfere with their judicial functions 
or to affect confidence in their independence.”
56
 This is not intended, however, to 
prevent them from doing or saying anything, Article 9 provides, though, that Judges 
“shall exercise their freedom of expression and association in a manner that is 
compatible with their office and that does not affect or appear to affect judicial 
independence or impartiality…While judges are free to participate in public debate on 
matters pertaining to legal subjects, the judiciary or the administration of justice, they 
shall not comment on pending cases and avoid expressing views which may undermine 
the standing and integrity of the Court”. Their extra-judicial activities are limited to those 
that are not “incompatible with their judicial function….or that may affect or may 
reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality.” These guidelines, 
although at something of a level of generality, do provide the basic framework for the 
judges to understand the appropriate boundaries, such that making any promises about 
possible cases or situations that may arise for a state would be inappropriate, but that 
there is nothing wrong in explaining the Court and its activities to states. Again, the 
watchwords here must be care, prudence and sensitivity to how things will appear to 
others.  
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